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In the past decades, constant brain drain 
has become a serious challenge for the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the be-
ginning of the 1990s, awareness of the 
problem and hence measures to counter 
this trend have increased. After some ef-
forts to attract Iranian expatriates’ inter-
est in investment in—or even remigration 
to—Iran, in 2005 the National Elites Foun-
dation was established. The foundation 
focuses on identification of highly gifted 
individuals, and support and preserva-
tion of the domestic elites to which they 
belong. Both material and non-material 
support are granted to select groups of 
beneficiaries, thus reflecting the Islamic 
Republic’s attempts to support and care 
for its citizens’ public and private lives.1
Iran is currently the country experienc-
ing the largest loss of human resources in 
Asia: at the end of the 1990s, economists 
estimated Iranian brain drain to be at fif-
teen percent (Carrington and Detragiache 
48). This emigration of highly skilled pro-
fessionals and academics has become a 
vitally important issue for the leaders of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Over the past sev-
eral years, active efforts have been made 
to deal with this challenge, which greatly 
affects the Iranian economy, as well as 
the country’s scientific and technological 
role in the region. One of the measures 
implemented is the establishment of the 
National Elites Foundation (Bonyad-e 
Melli-ye Nokhbegan, hereafter referred 
to as NEF) in 2005. Since most research 
on Iranian brain drain is based on data ac-
quired from outside of the country, exist-
ing research must be considered incom-
plete and reflective of a highly external 
view on the subject. Due to this deficit, the 
present study aims to make a contribution 
through examining and evaluating for the 
first time the statutes, documents, and 
reports of the NEF, and the country’s ef-
forts to stop or even reverse further migra-
tion of elites from Iran. The main question 
raised in this article is: What is the Iranian 
government’s perception of elite, and how 
is this definition influenced by brain drain? 
Furthermore, this article seeks to introduce 
the goals and aims of the NEF, along with 
its characteristics and its beneficiaries, 
addressing the question of whether the 
Islamic republic successfully nurtures its 
own intellectuals.
Defining Elite 
Modern elites can be divided in functional 
sector elites and partial elites. Following 
Gächter (7-8), one can also distinguish be-
tween different categories of elites, such 
as birth elites, value elites, functional elites, 
power elites, position elites, political elites, 
and counter-elites. In most classical cases, 
different forms are combined in a system, 
i.e. birth and power elites accompany a 
monarchy, power and position elites go 
with a totalitarian regime, while functional 
elites may also demonstrate characteristics 
of performance elites. The constitution of 
and affiliation between elites in a particular 
socio-political system is related to historical 
and social change (Gächter 8). 
Adapting and modifying Perthes’ model 
on changing elites in the Middle East 
(“Einleitung” 18) and Buchta’s model of 
Iranian informal power structures (9), Re-
iss-ner puts Iranian elites in three concen-
tric circles: (1) an inner-circle elite, which 
consists of high-ranking clerics and reli-
gious laymen, with the latter having en-
tered this circle only since the election of 
President Ahmadinejad. The inner-circle 
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elite determines the course of the Islamic 
republic—but contrary to during the first 
ten years after the revolution, no longer 
dominates discourse, rather only reacts 
to it. (2) Members of the administrative 
elite who participate and advise in the 
political decision-making process. They 
are predominantly state employees who 
largely work in secular professions, and 
the group has greatly increased since the 
revolution. (3) An outer circle consisting 
of the discourse elite is the most hetero-
geneous group: its members participate 
in discourse on political, economic, and 
socio-cultural issues. Along with journal-
ists, academics, and writers, members of 
this circle may come from the previous 
two circles, and it could be considered 
an intellectual elite (191-99). In addition, 
Rakel—based on Perthes—argues that the 
politically relevant elite not only distin-
guishes itself through positions in state 
institutions, decision-making on domestic 
and foreign policy, or active involvement 
in policy formulation—but also through its 
participation in defining norms and val-
ues.  From this perspective, the definition 
of elite is hence much wider, including 
politicians of the opposition, journalists, 
high bureaucrats, leading economists, 
members of the security agencies, intel-
lectuals, etc. Therefore, the politically rele-
vant elite in Iran is not made up exclusively 
of “decision-makers,” but rather incorpo-
rates “opinion-makers” as well (Rakel 16; 
Perthes, Arab Elites 5). 
The Iranian government and respective-
ly the NEF defines elite in its Statute of 
Recruitment and Preservation of Elites 
(“Āʾin-nameh-ye jazb va negahdari-ye 
niru-ye ensani-ye nokhbeh”) as a group 
of persons intelligent, capable, creative, 
and endowed with a brilliant mind. They 
are said to contribute to the acceleration 
of the country’s growth and develop-
ment with their intellectual activities and 
creations (Āʾin-nameh-ye jazb va negah-
dari), while having a noticeable influence 
on the output and spread of science, art, 
technology, culture, and administration of 
the country (Āshnayi ba zavabet 12). Re-
ferring to the categorization presented 
by Gächter (8), these state-defined elites 
can be classified as “performance elites” 
who are distinguished by above-average 
achievements in their respective profes-
sional fields. In the current power system 
of the Islamic Republic, according to the 
models offered by Perthes and Reissner, 
such elites are part of the third and outer-
most circle. They therefore belong to the 
intellectual-discourse elite as “opinion-
makers” in the Iranian socio-political field 
of discourse.
Iranian Brain Drain
What factors and conditions have influ-
enced this definition of elite? The Islamic 
Revolution of 1979 represented a major 
turning point. Starting in the 1950s, Iran’s 
prospering economy, increasing oil rev-
enues, and a change in Iranian society 
from traditionalism to modernism led an 
increasing number of upper- and middle-
class families to send their children to 
schools and universities abroad, mainly 
in the US, Great Britain, West Germany, 
France, Austria, and Italy. With the Islamic 
Revolution, and closure of Iranian Universi-
ties in 1980 that was to last for three years, 
a mass emigration of Iranian professionals 
began. The new government considered 
Western-educated professors and schol-
ars gharbzadeh, which can be translated 
as “indoctrinated by the West” or “wes-
toxicated,” and did not mind them leaving. 
This attitude towards the emigrated elites 
remained predominant until the end of the 
Iran-Iraq War and the start of a new agen-
da of economic policies under President 
Rafsandjani in 1989. In order to rebuild the 
war-torn country and its economy, the gov-
ernment called for Iranian specialists and 
professionals to return home to Iran. How-
ever, until 1993, only 2,600 highly skilled 
professionals and scientists answered this 
call. In light of an estimated diaspora of 
one to four million people of Iranian origin 
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worldwide, including relatively high edu-
cational qualifications among this group, 
the efforts of the Iranian government until 
then must be seen as highly unsuccessful 
(Torbat 276, 280; Hakimzadeh). 
The term brain drain (farar-e maghz-ha) 
did not emerge in the official rhetoric of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran until the late 
1990s. Awareness of not only a lack, but 
even a constant loss of know-how in the 
country emerged only during this decade. 
One of its consequences was the demand 
for more academic freedom in 1997 by 
Mostafa Mo’in, then-President Khatami’s 
education minister. President Khatami’s 
visit to the Unites States in 2000, during 
which he attended the UN Millennium 
Summit and expressed his concern over 
Iranian brain drain, along with an interest 
in attracting wealthy Iranians to invest in 
their home country, can be considered 
another landmark. Two years before, while 
addressing an Iranian audience in New 
York, he promoted financial engagement 
in Iran (Torbat 293-94). Considering the 
limited response and the small numbers 
of expatriates returning to Iran, scholars 
tend to declare this attempt a failure (Tor-
bat 295; Hakimzadeh)—or at least, as not 
successful enough to have had an effect 
on the increasing brain drain.
In present-day Iran, an economic crisis and 
subsequent high unemployment rates, 
social insecurity, limited freedom of the 
press, and living conditions in a political 
and social system saturated by religious-
moralistic rules set the stage for a further 
outflow of know-how. The Iranian Ministry 
of Science, Research and Technology as-
sessed the financial loss caused by brain 
drain at about 38 billion US dollars each 
year. In past years, four out of five Iranian 
winners of international science Olympi-
ads have chosen to leave the country for 
better opportunities abroad (Hakimza-
deh).2
In 2004, the Iranian government initiated a 
new approach to safeguard the country’s 
human resources: the focus shifted from 
recruitment of highly qualified specialists 
abroad, to the identification and support 
of professionals and experts already in the 
country. In September 2004, the council 
of ministers (heyʾat-e vaziran) passed the 
Statute of Recruitment and Preservation of 
Elites (Āʾin-nameh-ye jazb va negahdari-
ye niru-ye ensani-ye nokhbeh), and on 31 
May 2005, the NEF was founded by the 
Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolu-
tion (Shura-ye ʿ Ali-ye Enqelab-e Farhangi). 
With the establishment of the NEF, a foun-
dation for the support of more than 9,500 
intellectually gifted individuals by 2011 
was laid (Bonyad-e melli-ye nokhbegan, 
Gozaresh-e barnameh-ha 33).
Purpose and Practices of the  
Foundation
The foundation regards its own task as the 
identification, guidance, and financial and 
spiritual support of elites with the purpose 
of accelerating scientific and technologi-
cal productivity and the country’s develop-
ment. With the foundation, an advanced 
scientific, technological, and economic 
position in the Middle East is to be at-
tained. These defined goals lie within the 
framework of a perspective paper issued 
by the Expediency Discernment Council 
(Majmaʿ-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam), 
which came into effect in 2005. The paper 
outlines a distinct development of the 
country in the fields of economy, science, 
politics, culture, and society in four five-
year plans until 2025, and shows that the 
Iranian government is well aware of the 
significance of highly qualified profes-
sionals in worldwide competition for new 
technologies and development. In fact, the 
NEF in its 2011 annual report expressly de-
clared the migration of elites to be one of 
the fundamental challenges of the country 
(Gozaresh-e barnameh-ha 27). 
The NEF has released and published more 
than 30 documents to date, including 
guidelines on the identification of elites at 
universities and research centers, financial 
support for academic travel and research 
trips, establishment of science competi-
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tions, and procedural instructions for the 
assessment of international science con-
tests. 
The foundation’s structure consists of the 
office of the president, a board of directors 
(heyʾat-e omana) that is in charge of the 
budget and accounting and includes the 
president of the Islamic Republic as one of 
its members, and the elites’ council, which 
is responsible for interpretation of the 
foundation’s statutes and principles. The 
position of the president of the NEF is cur-
rently occupied by Nasrin Soltankhah. As 
president of the foundation, she becomes 
titular vice of the country. Soltankhah has 
worked as a presidential advisor on sci-
entific and technical affairs since 2005, 
and also acts as president of the Center 
for Women’s and Family Affairs (Markaz-e 
Omur-e Zanan va Khanevadeh). To ensure 
coverage for the whole country, the foun-
dation is not only located in the capital, but 
also maintains offices in two-thirds of the 
country’s provinces, with several offices 
still in the planning stages. They serve as 
the outposts of the central office in Tehran, 
covering educational and research institu-
tions in the respective provinces. 
Upon examination of the structure of the 
foundation, the close interaction and inte-
gration of the institution’s committees with 
the presidential office is particularly strik-
ing. The foundation’s president is always 
a vice president of Iran. The head of state 
himself, currently Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
both presides over the foundation com-
mission and is a member of the Supreme 
Court of the Cultural Revolution, which ap-
proves modifications of the foundation’s 
constitution. Such changes are in turn sug-
gested by the board of directors, while the 
foundation president presents them to the 
Supreme Court of the Cultural Revolution. 
That the president wields considerable in-
fluence in supporting elites and allowing 
them to apply their skills could be consid-
ered an accurate estimation. The fact that 
the foundation was established during the 
presidency of former President Khatami 
raises the question of the previous presi-
dent’s involvement in the development 
and implementation of the NEF.
Types of Beneficiaries and Selection 
Criteria
Among the beneficiaries of the founda-
tion’s privileges and grants are students, 
undergraduates, graduate students, and 
doctoral candidates; along with lecturers, 
inventors, research scientists, junior re-
searchers, winners of Quran competitions, 
and artists. 
Support starts from elementary school, 
where talented students are assisted and 
backed in the “responsibility of performing 
their task in the construction and rise of the 
country” (Bonyad-e melli-ye nokhbegan, 
Āshnayi ba zavabet 16). Beneficiaries at 
the university level qualify though univer-
sity entrance exams (konkur), national and 
international science olympiads, inven-
tions, creative and artistic activities, and 
top performance in their respective dis-
ciplines. The assistance includes financial 
aid and travel allowances. Inventors repre-
sent another important group of beneficia-
ries. An essential condition of admission 
is the marketability and practicability of 
their projects and inventions. The promo-
tion of junior researchers and research as-
sistants working in scientific centers and 
universities is linked to how innovative 
their research field is, and their former 
beneficiary status (i.e. as undergraduates 
or graduate students). Lecturers and re-
searchers connected to scientific centers 
and universities can profit from different 
types of assistance. They qualify by mea-
surement of their academic achievements 
and publications against the criteria of na-
tional and international scientific centers. 
Accordingly, grants consist of bestowing 
an academic chair, financial support for the 
acquisition of research equipment, travel 
allowances for domestic research trips and 
research-related journeys abroad, funding 
of a research assistant, and introduction to 
a number of ministries and committees. To 
facilitate beneficiaries’ access to interna-
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tional research and new technologies, the 
foundation furthermore seeks to establish 
a network of scientists on a national and in-
ternational level. Another group of benefi-
ciaries are artists: Every year eight individ-
uals who stand out due to their innovative, 
creative work and their contribution to the 
development of Iranian-Islamic society are 
chosen. The benefits they receive include 
reduced or eased military service (applying 
only to male beneficiaries) and allowances 
for the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca (also 
granted to other groups, see below). Win-
ners of national and international Quran 
recitation competitions represent a fur-
ther group among the foundation’s ben-
eficiaries. So long as they are enrolled at 
a university or theological seminary, they 
may receive undergraduate and graduate 
study or doctoral grants. Researchers in 
the field of theology have the possibility to 
obtain fellowships, innovation credits, and 
funding for Quran research, along with es-
tablishment of Quran classes (Bonyad-e 
melli-ye nokhbegan, Āshnayi ba zavabet; 
Āshnayi ba āʾin-nameh-ha; Gozaresh-e 
barnameh-ha).
With this category of beneficiaries, the 
character of the foundation as an institu-
tion embedded in a political system that 
regards religion as a self-evident part of 
its members’ lives becomes clear. Another 
element of this are cash donations given 
to newlywed couples who have received 
grant benefits, accompanied by atten-
dance of the foundation’s president at the 
ceremony. Apart from financial support, 
the foundation has also set up programs 
for the moral, spiritual, and religious en-
couragement and edification of the ben-
eficiaries, so they would “always feel in the 
service of the nation, the holy order of the 
Islamic Republic and its noble goals; not 
to remain in expectations but learn to pay 
their tax of knowledge and giftedness, and 
put it in the service of Islam and the Islamic 
nation” (Bonyad-e melli-ye nokhbegan, 
Gozaresh-e barnameh-ha 98). The stated 
aim of the NEF is to nurture a performance 
elite that is in the service of the Islamic re-
public and acts as one of its supporting 
pillars. Although the NEF’s elites would 
be located only in the outermost circle 
in the above-discussed elite model, the 
Islamic republic’s leaders are well aware 
of the elites’ future influence as part of the 
country’s discourse elite. One of the mea-
sures to ensure a proper attitude of these 
elites toward the Iranian-Islamic state is 
interweaving the country’s national inter-
ests with religious state ideology through 
its diverse programs. Other non-material 
benefits include special privileges regard-
ing military service and a onetime allow-
ance for the hajj. The former is offered to all 
beneficiaries holding university student or 
a doctoral candidate status, as well as to in-
ventors, artists, and winners of Quran com-
petitions. In practice, university students 
are exempted from military service for 
the duration of their studies; a large part 
of their military service can be replaced 
by research relevant to the armed forces 
(Bonyad-e melli-ye nokhbegan, Āshnayi 
ba zavabet 45-6). 
Beside these efforts for the identification 
and development of domestic elites, the 
Iranian government continues to devote 
attention to Iranian expatriate elites. A stat-
ute passed in 2009 expressly addresses 
expatriates by granting financial support 
for the acquisition of real estate and con-
struction of buildings in Iran. Conditions 
include, of course, a return to Iran and tak-
ing up employment at a national science 
or research center (Bonyad-e melli-ye 
nokhbegan, Gozaresh-e barnameh-ha 38).
Conclusion
The Islamic Republic’s official perception 
of elite demonstrates a strong focus on a 
scientific target group. This group, which 
can be referred to as a performance elite, 
belongs to the Iranian discourse elite, with 
its members acting as “opinion-makers” in 
Iranian socio-political discourse. Examin-
ing how the elites issue has developed 
over the past decades, a definitional focus 
becomes comprehensible. After a revolu-
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tion and almost a decade of war, the Irani-
an leadership and the country’s economy 
have experienced the consequences of 
the emigration of predominantly highly 
educated and professionalized Iranians. 
Since the tendency of emigration from Iran 
has not stopped or reversed since then, 
the government continues to struggle 
against ongoing brain drain, which cur-
rently represents the largest loss of human 
resources in the region. Confronted with 
challenging global competition, especially 
in the field of technology, the Iranian gov-
ernment thus hopes to catch up in the 
international struggle for highly qualified 
specialists. The long-range objective is ac-
quisition of an advanced scientific, tech-
nological, and economic position in the 
Middle East. One of the measures taken 
in this respect was the establishment of 
the NEF in 2005. Its programs aim at the 
recruitment and preservation of highly 
qualified professionals in order to accel-
erate the scientific, artistic, technological, 
and cultural growth and development of 
the country. The target group includes 
scientists, students, inventors, artists and 
winners of Quran competitions, to whom 
the foundation grants financial and mate-
rial support. Beside material allowances, 
the foundation provides non-material ben-
efits, which stand in contrast to material in-
ducements and benefits by demonstrat-
ing that those in charge of the NEF are not 
only interested in nurturing a technically 
and scientifically highly professionalized 
elite, but also the beneficiaries’ religious 
and moral education. This stems not only 
from Islamic holistic anthropology, which 
includes care and responsibility for the 
mental well-being of the members of Is-
lamic society, but also from a calculated 
aim to mold the Islamic Republic’s future 
cadres and elites.
A dominantly technical understanding of 
intellectual elites disregards the influence 
of opinion-making intellectuals and might 
turn out to be one of the major handicaps 
of such an approach. Regardless, the 
Iranian government is well aware of the 
elites’ influence as part of the country’s 
discourse elite. The foundation’s inclusion 
of religious-ideological allowances likely 
reflects this. To what extent the efforts of 
the NEF will pay off remains to be seen. 
Since all programs and privileges provid-
ed by the foundation focus on pull factors 
and almost completely neglect the social 
and political dimensions of the problem, 
whether this will ease the situation and for-
ward the country’s struggle against brain 
drain remains questionable. 
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Notes
1   This article is based on 
research conducted in the 
course of the author’s bachelor 
thesis: Leube, Julie S.: 
 “Migration und Braindrain 
im Iran.” BA thesis. Philipps-
Universität Marburg, 2011. 
Print.
2  A positive aspect of brain 
drain and migration that 
has long been neglected is 
the backflow of migrants’ 
resources, namely of knowhow 
and remittances to the 
home countries (Gibson and 
McKenzie 16). Given the lack 
of information and research 
on this issue with respect to 
the Iranian case, one can only 
speculate. Furthermore, the 
country’s isolated political and 
economic situation makes Iran 
a special case deserving of 
further investigation.
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